A By-Product of Political Oversight?
Agency Policy Influence with Legislators and Elected Executives*

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Abstract

Do agency officials hold influence over the policy decisions made by legislators and elected executives? For years, scholars have asserted the important informational role that bureaucrats play within the U.S. policymaking process. However, we have only limited knowledge of the theoretical mechanisms that may allow for this influence, or ultimately, whether or not this influence matters to U.S. policy outcomes. We theorize that the political oversight of the bureaucracy by elected officials provides a pathway for agency officials to advance their policy recommendations and broaden the agency’s policy influence. We assess this argument with survey data from almost 600 state agency heads, drawn from the 50 states and across all agency types. Using a multilevel model, we find that this “oversight mechanism” is a key driver of agency influence over gubernatorial policy decisions; however, it does a poor job explaining agency policy influence within state legislatures. Instead, agencies with larger policy networks fair better in influencing state legislative policy decisions.

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It is hard to ignore the enormous literature dedicated to measuring the influence elected officials hold over the U.S. bureaucracy’s policy decisions (e.g. Brudney and Hebert 1987; Gormley 1989; Wood and Waterman 1994; West 1995; Furlong 1998; Waterman and Rouse 1999; Shipan 2004; Kelleher and Yackee 2006). Yet, the converse has proved easily overlooked: we know relatively little about the size and nature of the public bureaucracy’s aggregate-level influence over policy decisions made by legislators and elected executives (such as presidents and governors). Stated differently, while it is well acknowledged that the bureaucracy contributes information and expertise to the policymaking process (Rourke 1984; Kingdon 1995; Kaufman 2001; Gailmard and Patty 2007), we have only limited knowledge of the theoretical mechanisms that may allow for this influence, or at the end of the day, whether or not this influence really matters to policy outcomes in the United States. Considering the vast literature in political science and public administration debating the most appropriate conceptualization of the bureaucracy’s position within the broader system of democratic governance (Goodsell 1983; Hill 1991; Cook 1998; Kaufman 2001; Warner 2001; Demir and Nyhan 2008; Meier and O’Toole 2008; Demir 2009), this oversight is even more surprising.

In this article, we advance the literature by specifying one such mechanism. We theorize that the political oversight provided by legislators and elected executives creates a pathway for the bureaucracy to influence the policymaking process. We argue that oversight performed by elected officials increases the amount of time that agencies—and specifically, agency heads—spend interacting with legislators, elected executives, and their staffs. These exchanges, we theorize, result not only in oversight; they also provide a mechanism for agencies to share information, expertise, and recommendations with elected officials and their staffs. In other words, we argue that political oversight reduces the communication barriers between “agents”
and their “principals”, and in doing so, augments the aggregate-level policy influence administrative agencies have on legislators and elected executives. Thus, we suggest an important, and to our knowledge, previously overlooked “by product” resulting from the political oversight of the U.S. bureaucracy: increased agency influence on the policy-related decision-making of elected officials.

We recognize that this theorized “oversight mechanism” is only one explanation for how and why agency officials may influence policymaking in other political institutions. Consequently, we also offer and test two other likely explanations. The first focuses on the ability of agency officials to harness their larger policy network to influence policymaking in legislatures and with the governor (Rourke 1984; O’Leary 1994; Kaufman 2001). In short, an agency with a broader constituency may affect policy change by either working indirectly through its network, by having its policy preferences reinforced by its “friends”, or both. A second set of drivers may be agency and administrator characteristics, such as administrator age, gender, or partisan leanings, which have the potential to affect agency policy influence. It also may be that agencies, which vary greatly in terms of internal or external resources (Ringquist 1995), are differently suited in their ability to sway elected officials’ policy decision-making.

We assess our argument with data drawn primarily from the American State Administrators Project (ASAP), which secured survey information from almost 600 state agency heads from across the 50-states and all categories of public agencies in 2008. We then augment these data with information on state-level institutional powers, environmental characteristics, and partisanship. We use a multilevel model, with individuals nested in states, to assess the argument. We find that the hypothesized oversight mechanism is a key predictor of agency influence over gubernatorial policy decisions. Our results demonstrate that as the governor and
his/her staff initiates more contacts with agency leadership, agency influence on gubernatorial
decision-making increases by as much as 36 percent. However, oversight matters much less to
agency influence in state legislatures, where we find that agencies with larger policy networks
are better able to affect state legislator decision-making. Our results, in the end, suggest that
agencies hold noteworthy and considerable influence within the broader policymaking process,
and in the case of the elected executive, part of this influence appears attributable to lines of
communication opened due to the political oversight of the bureaucracy.

**Theoretical Foundations and Argument**

The theoretical foundations for this article rest upon three largely distinct literatures. The
first literature focuses on the accountability of the U.S. bureaucracy to its elected political
principals. The second literature highlights the role of the bureaucracy in influencing aggregate-
level policy outcomes, while the third, the burgeoning networking literature, suggests a place for
agencies within the broader policy community. From the perspective of theory development, it
is surprising that these literatures are infrequently in conversation with each other—especially
considering the critical questions they engage with respect to the modern study of bureaucratic
politics and public management. There are, of course, exceptions to this characterization, which
we highlight below; nevertheless, part of this article’s contribution is in identifying the overlap
and in beginning to connect these three general lines of thinking in our argument. We now
review select findings from these literatures.

**Political Accountability**

One of the key theoretical puzzles within the study of bureaucratic politics over the past
30 years centers on the political accountability of the U.S. bureaucracy. On the one hand, the
bureaucracy is seen as an important maker and implementer of public policy (Wilson 1989; West
1995; Furlong 1998; Kerwin 2003; Kaufman 2001; Yackee 2006a). Indeed, Shipan (2004, 467) concludes that the “political bureaucracy makes the overwhelming majority of public policy decisions in the United States” (Shipan 2004, 467). Yet, on the other hand, this policymaking power raises concerns related to the so-called non-delegation doctrine, or the idea that elected officials may not devolve meaningful policymaking decisions to non-elected agency officials.

The “solution” to this puzzle, at least the solution put forward in many scholarly accounts, resides with the ability of elected political principals to oversee the bureaucracy’s work and thereby hold the bureaucracy politically accountable. Elected principals employ numerous tools to ensure this accountability (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Gormley 1989; Wilson 1989; West 1995). Executive influence on the bureaucracy may manifest itself through the appointment of like-minded agency leadership (Wood and Waterman 1994; Whittington and Carpenter 2003), the creation of centralized executive structures, such as the president’s Office of Management and Budget, to review agency budget requests and regulatory decision-making (West 2005; Yackee 2006b), and more informal mechanisms, such as personal phone calls or emails (Kelleher and Yackee 2006). Congress’s (or state legislatures’) ability to monitor the bureaucracy may occur via oversight hearings (Aberbach 1990, 2002), setting agency budgets (McCubbins 1985; Wood and Waterman 1994), reviewing regulatory decisions (Kerwin 2003; Yackee 2006b); designing agencies (Wood and Bohte 2004; MacDonald 2007), and imposing administrative procedures (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989; Potoski 1999).

Ultimately, numerous scholars conclude that elected officials hold at least some influence over agency decision-making in the U.S. context (for a summary, see Wood and Waterman 1994). Yet, despite this conclusion and the many mechanisms used to insure accountability, bureaucrats can still hold noteworthy political power within these “principal-agent” relationships.
Krause (1996), for instance, focuses on the president, Congress, and one agency, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). He demonstrates that oversight by elected officials influences SEC behavior, but he also finds that SEC actions—as measured by the agency’s enforcement activities—can influence the budgetary preferences of Congress and the president. Krause (1996, 1089) then concludes, “To accurately understand administrative behavior one must also understand how it can shape political preferences…”.

Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1995, 1999) offer a similar bridge between the political accountability and agency policy influence literatures. They suggest problems associated with bureaucratic politics applications of the principal-agent model, while also emphasizing the bureaucracy’s independent ability to affect policy outcomes. Indeed, some 15 years ago, they identified a gap in knowledge that still remains. Meier and co-authors wrote, “No empirical study has assessed the role of bureaucracies in agenda setting or policy adoption despite the descriptive literature that shows agencies actively lobby their political superiors for changes in law and policy” (1995, 428). It is to this literature that we now turn.

**Agency Policy Influence**

With respect to agency influence on the decision-making of elected officials, one thing is clear: most early scholars suggest that there ought to be little of it. This point it made most clearly in Wilson’s (1887) seminal work laying out the “politics-administration dichotomy”, namely that “public administration is somehow distinct from the political” or, at least, that administration ought to be distinct from politics (Wilson 1887, 210). This proposition set the stage for the work of an entire generation of scholars (Waldo 1980; Mosher 1982; Goodnow
1990), and provided the theoretical reasoning behind the “neutral competence” ideal for bureaucrats (Kaufman 1956; Klay 1983; Catron 1989; McSwite 1997).

Yet, a varied and equally vast body of work challenges this dichotomy (Heyman 1987; Denhardt 1989; Fredrickson 1997; Cook 1998; Demir and Nyhan 2008). As Goodsell (2006, 627) writes, “Politicians obviously are more policy makers and principals than bureaucrats, but to conclude that the latter never engage in formative or constitutive political activity is shortsighted to the extreme.” This notion of “complementarity” as an alternative framework is commonly put forth in critiques of the dichotomy, although it is applied most often within the study of city managers (Maynard-Moody 1998; Svara 1999; Wheeland 2000; Demir and Nyhan 2008; Demir 2009). Essentially, this perspective says that the more accurate portrayal of the relationship between elected officials and administrators is “a continuum that moves from politics on one end towards management on the other… [and] accepts overlapping roles and reciprocal influence” (Demir 2009, 877).

Thus, bureaucrats are typically conceived of as holding some level of influence over the decision-making of elected officials. Yet, while the debate as to whether agency influence is normatively good or bad for our representative democracy is relatively well tilled ground, we know much less, from an empirical standpoint, about the extent of the bureaucracy’s influence or how it may manifest itself. O’Leary (1994, 443), when referencing the policy influence of mid-level career professional managers, puts it plainly, “That public managers … work with the forces in their environment is almost commonsensical. Yet, there is little empirical evidence in either the organizational theory literature or the bureaucratic politics literature of … public managers actually attempting to shape their environment.”

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1 One possible exception to this characterization is scholarship on “iron triangles”—the broad idea that agency officials, congressional committee members, and interest group representatives make policy together within a closed
As Kaufman (2001, 21) writes, it must be acknowledged that bureaucrats “play a prominent part in formulating the directives they receive!” (emphasis original). He suggests a number of reasons for this influence, including policy experience, technical expertise, and the need for legislators to secure “practical knowledge” during policy formation. According to this line of thinking, agency officials are influential because their expertise gives them credibility, as well as access to policymakers. Kaufman also extends agency policy influence beyond the legislative arena; he pointedly suggests that the political executives, to whom agency officials often serve, regularly solicit policy advice and recommendations from the public bureaucracy.

There is ample case study and descriptive evidence confirming Kaufman’s claims that the bureaucracy actively advises and lobbies elected policymakers. For instance, O’Leary (1994) provides a concrete example of career agency officials holding influence over legislative policymaking in her study of the Nevada Department of Wildlife. In so doing, O’Leary suggests that agency officials can, and do, lobby for change when unhappy with the status quo policy. Similarly, Stein (1991) describes city fire-fighters lobbying the state legislature in Missouri for pay increases, while Maynard-Moody (1989) provides an example of state corrections officers using their policy knowledge to help shape state legislative decision-making.

In sum, these case studies, as well as the modern bureaucratic politics and policy process literatures, generally align around answers to the whether and why questions (Rourke 1984; Ripley and Franklin 1987; Wilson 1989; Kingdon 1995; Kaufman 2001). Stated differently, it is not a matter of whether or not agency officials influence the policymaking process; they do. And
it is not a matter of why agencies influence policy-related decision-making; the answer stems from the technical expertise, academic training, and professionalization that agency officials bring to the broader policymaking process. Indeed, as Gailmard and Patty’s (2007) formal model results demonstrate, the civil service personnel structures that underlie much of the modern U.S. bureaucracy actually incentivize those bureaucrats, who are motivated to affect policy decisions, to attain even greater levels of policy-specific expertise. Yet, despite some consensus on these whether and why questions, we still hold only limited knowledge regarding the theoretical mechanisms that may allow for this influence, or at the end of the day, the degree to which this influence affects policy decision-making in the United States.

**Argument-An Oversight Mechanism**

We theorize that the political oversight provided by legislators and elected executives (such as presidents and governors) opens up opportunities for agency officials to share policy-relevant information and expertise, and in so doing, to affect the aggregate-level decision-making of elected officials. The act of political oversight, we argue, causes agency officials to interact and communicate more with those elected officials tasked with overseeing the bureaucracy. We expect some oversight to occur because elected officials depend on the bureaucracy to write regulations, implement policy, and monitor and enforce compliance with existing law and policy.

We consider political oversight to be any contact with an agency official initiated by a legislator, the governor/president, or a member of their personal staffs that aims to obtain information, clarification, or explanation for agency choices or bureaucratic behavior. These interactions may be friendly or adversarial in nature. Examples of oversight include formal hearings, personal phone calls, negotiations regarding the creation of administrative procedures, and budget talks. It is important to note that our focus is on “active” forms of oversight, as
opposed to “passive” forms; we have no theoretical expectation that passive forms of oversight, such as those proposed by McCubbins, Noll, Weingast (1987, 1989) and others, which may occur years after the creation of an administrative hoop or hurdle, would affect the current policy influence of bureaucrats. Some form of personal contact must be initiated by an elected official (or their personal staffs) with an agency official for our theorized mechanism to be activated.

Once a contact is initiated, our argument builds on the scholarship of others regarding why agency officials hold some influence over elected officials decision-making. We reason that agency officials bring special expertise, often have unique academic training and professionalization, and hold technical knowledge that are important to the formation of public policy (Rourke 1984; Ripley and Franklin 1987; Wilson 1989; Kingdon 1995; Kaufman 2001). As Kindgon (1995) suggest, these bureaucratic assets are distributed across public organizations—from top-level, often politically-appointed, agency heads through lower-level civil service employees; each will have ideas and policy-related feedback about what new topics and existing policy solutions should part of elected officials’ decision-making agendas.

Where we differ with past work is in specifying two things: first, how this information and expertise is transmitted from agencies to elected officials, and second, how much it matters. We hypothesize that the previously discussed “oversight mechanism” is an important pathway for agency policy influence on legislators and elected executives. We also hypothesize that agency influence is substantial in size. In the end, we suggest that agency influence is an underestimated feature of the broader policymaking process, as well as an undervalued bureaucratic policymaking tool. In making this argument, our work falls within a long line of literature on the policy consequences attached to the oversight duties performed by elected officials over the (largely) unelected bureaucracy. Our contribution, however, is noteworthy
because we look for aggregate-level policy consequences not within administrative agencies themselves, as has been done in countless studies, but instead, within the broader policymaking process. Consequently, we see our contribution to be in identifying a key “spill over” or “by-product”, if you will, of the political oversight of the bureaucracy, namely increased agency influence on policy-related decision-making.

**Networking**

We would be remiss to suggest that this hypothesized “oversight pathway” is the only mechanism for agencies to influence the decision-making of elected officials, and we now suggest one a key alternate influence pathway—via policy networks. There is a burgeoning line of research investigating the networking patterns of public organizations. Although network creation and management are certainly not without their challenges (Raab and Milward 2003; O’Toole and Meier 2004; Graddy and Chen 2006), the general consensus is that the benefits outweigh the costs, or in other words, that networking by an administrator has positive results for public organizations (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Klijn 1996; Raab and Milward 2003; Meier and O’Toole 2001; 2005; Hicklin, O’Toole, and Meier 2008). For our purposes here, the most relevant line of research within this wide body of work is how that occurs, although to that question, scholars have offered many answers.

Network research has been particularly useful in characterizing the complexities of the policy process and policymaking environments (Herranz 2007). Essentially, networks emerged in part to deal with the wicked problem of policy implementation (Rittel and Webber 1973; O’Toole and Meier 2004; Weber and Khademian 2008), and exist to serve a multitude of purposes. For example, networks bring together individuals and groups with common (or collective) goals (Provan and Kenis 2007; Kilduff and Tsai 2003), aid in coordination and
enhanced service provision (Isett and Provan 2005), offer opportunities for entrepreneurial managers (Bardach 1998), and promote the sharing of information and knowledge (Hamel 1991; Tushman and Scanlan 1981; Root 2003; Schau, Smith, and Schau 2005).

With respect to the how question, others investigate the political dimensions of a network, although O’Toole and Meier (2004) contend that this line of work receives too little attention. They conclude: “The bulk of research on networks and public management effectively reenacts a network version of the venerable politics-administration dichotomy” (O’Toole and Meier 2004; 683). Their work is notable as it identifies key political challenges for administrators related to the creation of networks, in addition to the consequences of network participation with respect to cooptation and coproduction. However, their points are directed more towards the nefarious effects of the horizontal relationships between administrators and their partners rather than on how networking influences the broader policy making process (see broadly, Palus and Yackee 2009).

Others have more directly addressed the potential effects of networking on the vertical relationships between political principals and their agents. Essentially, this line of work shifts the focus from network management (McGuire 2002; Agranoff and McGuire 2001) to network influence. Here a wide body of work on policy and issue networks focuses on the subsystems that develop in across policy areas and include actors from government and beyond (Heclo 1978; Berry 1989; Sabatier 1988). Of particular importance to this article, Kaufman (2001; see also O’Leary 1994) writes that public agencies will use their friends and “constituencies” within their policy and issue networks to pressure their political superiors for policy change. Indeed, Goodsell (2006) goes so far as to characterize external policy networks as “the new institution taking over governance” (628), although he argues that because networks have grown, the
leadership of public administrators has also changed. He writes: “[L]eadership is now achieved by negotiation and persuasion rather than command” (Goodsell 2006; 628).

These streams of research, investigating networks in addition to the act of networking, are all important as they set the stage for an alternative mechanism to explain bureaucrat influence on the decision-making of the governor and the legislature. A definition offered by Juenke (2005) is particularly appropriate for this unpacking of the potential role of networking as a mechanism for the bureaucracy’s influence on the decision-making of political principals. Networks, he writes, are “patterns of communication that lie outside of the traditional policy structure but do not exclude traditional components of hierarchy” (Juenke 2005; 114). If this is in fact the case, then we might expect a network to act as a mediator; in other words, an agency with a broader constituency may affect policy change by either working indirectly through its network, by having its policy preferences reinforced by its “friends”, or both.

**Testing the Argument**

**Data and Methods**

We rely primarily on data from the 2008 iteration of the American State Administrators’ Project (ASAP) to test our hypotheses. ASAP’s principle aim is to collect survey information from all state agency heads active in the American states. The 2008 version of ASAP was a mail questionnaire sent to state agency heads in different types of agencies in all 50 American states. ASAP surveys secured replies from approximately 800 agency heads in 2008, which represent a response rate of 25% percent, and the ASAP replies used in this article have been confirmed as representative of the full population of state agency heads contacted by ASAP.² The responses to this survey provide the empirical base for variables that measure the attributes, activities,

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² Follow-up conversations with a random sample of the survey non-respondents were completed. This analysis demonstrated that the respondents did not systematically differ from the non-respondents on a number of dimensions, including personal, political, and professional characteristics.
actions, and attitudes of state administrators. We supplement the ASAP survey data with information on state-level institutional powers, environmental characteristics, and partisanship. This information comes from a variety of sources, which we discuss below in connection with the specific model variables.

We draw primarily upon the ASAP data to test our argument for three main reasons. First and most importantly, while we acknowledge that these informed assessments and attitudes of state agency heads do not explain the totality of political reality, our reasoning follows Hoffmann’s (1967, 57; see also Weick 1979, 1995, 2001), who writes, “[P]erceptions are more than a part of political reality: they mold it, insofar as they are the springs and fuel of action.” Thus, we view the informed opinions of state agency heads as a critical and scientifically valid lens for understanding political phenomenon and relationships. Second, the use of state agency heads’ perceptions allows us to provide an aggregate-level assessment of agency influence on legislative and executive decision-making. Past work on the topic (e.g. O’Leary 1994; Krause 1996) is either only descriptive in nature and/or is constrained to single agencies. The use of informed agency opinions allows us to test our hypotheses with data on all agency types and across the 50 states. Third, a variety of scholars have relied on the perceptions of agency heads as a critical indicator of political decision-making. We follow in this rich tradition (e.g. Brudney, Hebert, and Wright 2000; Bowling and Ferguson 2001; Brudney et al. 2005; Kelleher and Yackee 2006; Palus and Yackee 2009; Jacobson, Palus, and Bowling, forthcoming), while also responding to Goodsell’s (2006) call for more studies focusing on the perspectives and perceptions of public administrators.

We employ a multilevel linear modeling strategy with individuals agency heads nested in states to test the hypotheses. A hierarchical design offers a multitude of methodological
advantages. First, it recognizes and controls for the clustering of individuals within larger units, and thus, it does not violate the assumption of statistical independence. Second, it accounts for the possibility of non-constant variance across different states (Raudenbush and Bryck 2002; Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Gelman et al. 2007). Finally, as suggested by Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) and Brudney et al. (2005), hierarchical governance structures of governance drive almost all public programs, and this fact ought to be acknowledged in efforts to explain policy-related decision-making. Failure to use a multilevel strategy for nested data can result in biased standard errors as well as incorrect Type I error rates (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). A multilevel model involves the estimation of both a level-1 (individual) and a level-2 (state) model (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

**Dependent Variables**

We use two dependent variables in subsequent models – *Agency Policy Influence on Governor* and *Agency Policy Influence on Legislature*. The question on the ASAP survey from which these two variables were drawn follows: “Your agency possesses important policy-relevant information and expertise that may influence decisions made by other policy actors, e.g. the governor and legislature. Over the past four years has your agency influenced the decision-making of any of the following? If yes, please indicate, on a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high) the degree of influence.” (Emphasis original.)³ Respondents who answered “No” in the initial screening question were coded as zero. Thus, the dependent variable is a six-point scale, ranging from zero to five. The mean for the *Agency Policy Influence on Governor* was 2.99, while the mean for the variable measuring influence on the legislature was slightly higher at 3.23. Descriptive statistics for all model variables are displayed in Table 1.

³ Some of the ASAP questions ask respondents to evaluate influence patterns over a number of years. The questions that make up our dependent variables, which have four year time horizons, are no exception.
Independent Variables

Our independent variables are organized into four broad groups: oversight influence, network influence, agency and issue environment, and administrator characteristics. Below we discuss the indicators within each category.

Oversight Influence. We include four variables to tap the degree of oversight influence exerted by the political principal. These variables provide empirical leverage on our first hypothesis. The first measure was constructed from a question that asked respondents to assess whether the governor or the legislature exercised greater control and oversight over the agency. We converted the survey question into two dummy variables. In the governor model, a value of “1” indicates that the Governor was a greater source of control and oversight. In the legislative model, a value of “1” indicates that the respondent pointed to the legislature as the greater source of control and oversight. We expect, for example, that agencies that view the governor as a greater source of control and oversight will have increased oversight interactions with the governor and governor’s staff, thereby providing an important pathway for agency policy influence on legislators and elected executives.

The second indicator captures who serves as catalyst for policy change in agencies. This was constructed from a question on the survey that reads: “Were any shifts in program priorities the result of policy initiatives or actions originated by any of the following?” The response options included: legislators, governor, agency staff, local government officials, national government officials, clientele groups, other interest groups, the news media, and state courts. Two dummy variables were constructed for the agency heads, who checked “governor” and “legislators.” The variable tapping the governor as a source of policy initiative was included in
the governor model, and alternatively, the variable pointing to legislators was included in the legislative model. Fifty-four percent of respondents pointed to the governor as a source of priority change; 61 percent noted the legislature in that role. When either actor is serving in this capacity, then we anticipate increased oversight interactions and communications.

The third and fourth indicators of oversight in each model tap the number of contacts with agency heads initiated by elected political principals—namely, the governor, the governor’s staff, the legislature, and the legislative staff. These variables were constructed from a series of questions on the ASAP survey that asked agency heads to assess how frequently they were in contact with these individuals, be it daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly, or never. We then converted this scale into one measured in days. Thus, when contacts took place daily between the governor’s staff and an agency head then we coded this observation as 250; weekly contacts as 50; monthly as 12; less than monthly as 6; and never as 0.4

Respondents were then asked to evaluate the percentage of contacts initiated by these political principals, with the options of none, 20 percent, 40 percent, 60 percent, 80 percent, or 100 percent. We multiplied this percentage by the number of contact days to calculate the Number of contacts variables. In the governor model, we included the contacts initiated by the governor and governor’s staff; in the legislative model, we included contacts initiated by legislators and legislative staff with the agency head.5 The mean values for each were 7.92 (governor), 26.84 (governor’s staff), 20.52 (legislators), and 20.55 (legislative staff). In following the first hypothesis, we expect that greater levels of oversight contacts initiated by the governor, legislators, or their staffs will yield increased agency influence.

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4 We assumed 50 weeks of work per year (two weeks of vacations), and based on conversation in to days on this fact. Thus, daily contact is calculated as: 50 weeks*5 work days per week = 250 contacts.
5 The governor/legislators and governor’s staff/legislative staff variables are included separately in the models. In doing so, we gain insight as to how oversight takes place and how it may inform policy-related decisions.
Network Influence. Two variables were included in each model to measure administrators’ perceptions about the regularity and effectiveness of their networking behaviors with external stakeholders and political players. Our expectation is that when administrators have broader networks, they are more likely to influence policymaking by “working their networks”, through the reinforcements of policy ideas and recommendations provided by network partners to political principals, or some combination of the two.

The first variable, *Agency Policy Influence on Clientele Groups*, asked respondents to assess their level of influence on the decision-making of clientele groups. Responses ranged from zero (no influence) to five (high influence) with a mean of 2.8. The second variable, *Networking Ability Scale*, is an additive scale compiled from a series of questions that asked state agency heads to evaluate the frequency of their contacts with the following parties: personnel in other state agencies, clientele groups, citizens, officials in other states, local officials, and national officials. Choice categories were daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly, or never, and we then converted this scale into one measured in days. Responses ranged from a minimum of six to a maximum of 30, with a mean of approximately 19. The alpha for the scale is 0.73, indicating solid scale reliability and construction.

Agency and Issue Environment. We also include a series of additional variables to tap dimensions and characteristics of the agency and issue environment at the state level. For instance, *Agency Salience* is a dummy variable, with values of “1” indicating the state administrator leads an agency dealing with functional areas of greater salience to their citizens. One might anticipate that agencies tasked with high salience policy duties would have more influence on political principals. The ASAP implementers place each of the agencies included in the survey into one of 13 functional categories. We then further categorized these functional

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6 This process is described above in connection with the oversight variables.
categories. To do so, we relied on Gormley’s (1986) definition of salience when deciding whether or not the agencies found within a particular functional category were salient or not.\footnote{Gormley (1986, 598) writes “[a] highly salient issue is one that affects a large number of people in a significant way.” The salient functional categories of agencies were: Income Security and Social Services, Education, Health, Natural Resources, Environment and Energy, Economic Development, and Criminal Justice. The non-salient categories were Elected Officials (for example, State Treasury), Fiscal Staff, Non-Fiscal Staff, Regulatory, Transportation, and Other (for example, State Library).}

The variables \textit{Number of Employees} and \textit{Size of Budget} measure characteristics related to the size of the agency. Again, one might expect that larger agencies would hold greater influence on the governor and legislators than would smaller agencies. Thus, we control for these factors.

We include a number of state-level constructs in our analyses, as well. In both models, we include an indicator tapping the \textit{Number of Interest Group Registrations}, as measured by Gray and Lowery (2001). This measure picks up the density of state interest group environments in 1999. It may be that a denser environment of organized interests will decrease overall agency policy influence. We also include a number of variables tapping state institutional characteristics. In the governor’s model, we include the average of Beyle’s measures of the institutional and personal powers of the governor for 2005 and 2007 (Beyle 2009).\footnote{The \textit{Institutional Powers of Governor} index is comprised of measures tapping the election of executive branch officials, the tenure potential of governors, appointment powers, budgetary powers, veto power, and party control. The \textit{Personal Powers} index uses measures of the governor’s electoral mandate, political ambition, personal future, and job performance.} Higher numbers on these scales indicate greater powers. It is possible that in states where the governor’s powers are stronger, there will be less agency influence on the decision-making of the top executive.

In the legislative model, we include two institutional characteristics—\textit{Legislative Term Limits} and \textit{Legislative Professionalism}. \textit{Term Limits} is a dummy variable with values of “1” indicating the presence of terms limits in 2008 and is collected from the National Conference of State Legislatures. \textit{Legislative Professionalism} is a rank, which is collected from Squire (2000),
with higher values representing more professionalized legislatures. We control for both factors because agency provided expertise may be more valuable in term limited state legislatures and in less professionalized institutions.

**Administrator Characteristics.** The final set of control variables taps specific characteristics of the agency head. *Percent of time spent on policy development* was taken from a survey question that asked respondents to enumerate what percent of their time is devoted to Policy Development (with Governors, Legislators, and Boards). We see this as a critical control variable measuring an agency head’s attempts to influence policy development, outside of the oversight and networked influence pathways that we put forward and test in this article. *Party Match* measures whether the administrator’s self-identified political party is the same as the governor or the legislative majority. Agency administrators from the same political party as the elected executive, or from the majority party in the legislative branches, may be better positioned to see their policy preferences enacted. Using similar logic, we also include a dummy variable to control for the appointment process of the state agency heads, with a value of “1” indicating that the administrator was appointed by the governor and a zero otherwise.

The variable *Aversion to the “give and take” of policymaking* was constructed from an ASAP survey question which asked respondents to evaluate on a five-point scale (ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree) their feelings about the following statement: “The give and take of public policy making doesn’t appeal to me.” This variable controls for the general policy inclinations of specific administrators. Finally, a number of standard demographic controls were included, including *Education, Gender, Race, Years in Agency,* and *Age.*
Results

This article assesses the validity of two hypotheses. We begin by exploring the general size and nature of agency influence within the broader policymaking process. We then discuss the necessary background information that informs the multilevel, multivariate analysis, and finally, the oversight mechanism results.

Agency Policy Influence

In short, our results suggest that agencies hold considerable influence over elected officials’ decision-making. We draw this conclusion from an analysis of the descriptive statistics for the article’s two dependent variables, Agency Policy Influence on the Governor and Agency Policy Influence on the Legislature. As discussed above, we asked state agency leadership to assess their level of influence on the governor and the legislature, as well as clientele groups. As a general matter, state agency heads rated their influence on the governor moderately high, at 3.00, with a standard deviation of 1.57 on the influence scale that ranged from 0 to 5 (whereas 0 is no influence, 1 is low influence, and a 5 is high influence). Their perceived influence on the legislature was even greater, at 3.19 with a standard deviation of 1.24 and range from 0 to 5.

It somewhat is difficult, however, to fully understand these levels of influence, given that we have no proper baseline comparisons for how “large” agency influence is or ought to be. Indeed, we know of no other existing aggregate-level empirical measures of agency policy influence. Fortunately, the literature provides us some information for benchmarking: the “political control” of the U.S. bureaucracy literature, found primarily within the political science tradition, and “politics-administrative dichotomy” tradition, found mostly in public administration scholarship have one thing in common, they both value a constrained and limited U.S. bureaucracy. Given this normatively-driven baseline, the perceived influence of agency
heads uncovered in this article is worrisomely high.

We interpret these results to mean that state agency heads do, in fact, hold considerable influence over state legislative and gubernatorial decision-making; yet, this influence is far from absolute and varies noticeably across agencies. Thus, we cautiously suggest that these quantitative results are not worrisomely high; instead, they fit well within the standard understanding of agency influence (e.g. Rourke 1984; Wilson 1989; Kingdon 1995; Kaufman 2001). Moreover, our agency influence measures for legislatures and elected executives are similar to one empirical baseline with which we can compare our results—agency influence on clientele groups. The ASAP survey also asked administrators to assess their influence on the decision-making of clientele groups. On this question, respondents provided a similar, although slightly lower, level of influence on clientele groups than on elected officials, with an average level of 2.82 (standard deviation of 1.50 and a range of 0 to 5).

But how does this influence manifest itself? What pathways give allow it to occur? Our final set of results presents some traction on these critical questions.

Assessing the Oversight Mechanism

An initial step in multilevel analyses is beginning with an “unconditional” or null model (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 24; Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 224) in order to estimate the variation in each dependent variable attributable to state-level differences. Such a model includes no predictors at either the individual or state level. The level-1 model—essentially a

---

9 The standard deviations on both dependent variables suggest that agency policy influence varies considerably. As a result, we explored this variation through a series of t-tests to investigate. Of particular interest was whether or not these ratings varied based on agency salience, or stated differently, whether or not the respondent leads an agency dealing with functional areas of greater salience to their citizens. With respect to both the perceived influence on the governor and on clientele groups, administrators in more salient agencies ranked their influence higher. In both instances, there was a statistically significant difference in the means between salient and non-salient agencies. For influence on the legislature, however, the difference was insignificant.
one-way ANOVA with random effects—follows for the first dependent variable tapping perceptions of policy influence on governor.

\[ Agency \text{ Policy Influence on Governor}_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + r_{ij} \]

The level-2 model then seeks to explain \( \beta_{0j} \) via the following equation,

\[ \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} \]

By substituting the level-2 equation into level-1, the full hierarchical model to be estimated is

\[ Agency \text{ Policy Influence on Governor}_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} + r_{ij} \]

where \( \gamma_{00} \), the constant, represents the average level of agency policy influence on the governor, \( u_{0j} \) (the state-level random effect) is the variance component of the level-2 units, and \( r_{ij} \) (the individual-level random effect) is the variance component of the level-1 units. Essentially, at this stage in the analysis, we are primarily interested in \( u_{0j} \), which tells us whether significant state-level variation (or clustering) is present. In other words, this effect captures whether the agency influence on the governor varies significantly at the state level in the sample. Because the coefficient for the random effect is significant, we conclude that there is some important variation at the state level that must be acknowledged, and therefore, the multilevel model is an appropriate strategy.\(^{10}\) A similar result is observed for the second dependent variable, the \( Agency \text{ Policy Influence on Legislature} \). These results are displayed in Table 2.

(Insert Table 2 here)

We now turn to the multivariate analyses in which we seek to explain this variation.

Recall the core hypothesis proposed above. We hypothesized that oversight serves as a pathway

---

\(^{10}\) We also calculated the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), which indicates how the overall variance in the dependent variable is divided between the individual and state level (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). For both dependent variables, approximately two percent of the variance is attributable to state-level differences. Although this ICC percentage is small, it is not inconsistent with other articles using similar modeling strategies (e.g. Rahn and Rudolph 2005). Furthermore, as Steenbergen and Jones (2002) suggest, due to the individual-level measurement of the dependent variable in all multilevel models, we should expect to see the vast majority of the variance explained at the individual-level.
for agency policy influence on legislators and elected executives. In Tables 3 and 4, we present the results from our model estimations.\footnote{The sample size of the final models is somewhat smaller than the full ASPA survey due to some missing values on the independent variables.}

(Insert Tables 3 and 4 here)

The Governor’s Model. With respect to the influence agency heads have on the decision-making of governors, we see strong evidence supporting our hypothesis. In the presence of greater oversight, the influence of administrators on the decision-making of the executive branch of state governments is noticeably stronger. As evidenced in Table 3, all four of the indicators for oversight are statistically significant and in the hypothesized, positive direction. In other words, when the governor is acknowledged as a greater source of oversight and when he/she is a source of priority changes for an agency, the perceived influence of the agency on the governor increases. Also, when the number of contacts initiated by the governor and/or the governor’s staff increases, so too does the influence of the agency leader on the decision-making processes of the governor. These results suggest that gubernatorial oversight can open up channels for communication and interaction, and ultimately, agency influence.

To more effectively understand the magnitude of these coefficients, we calculated the predicted values of the statistically significant variables. To do so, we generated the predicted values for the dependent variable under different scenarios of the independent variables. In the final column of Table 3, we present the results of these calculations for the governor’s model. Here, we varied the independent variable from its minimum observed value to its maximum observed value in the data while holding all other variables constant at their mean. Thus, the value in the table may be thought of as the percentage shift in the perceived influence of the administrator on the governor’s decision-making under these scenarios. The most pronounced
results are observed for the two variables tapping the contacts initiated by the governor and his/her staff. Moving from the minimum of zero daily contacts initiated by the governor to the maximum of 200 contacts per year, we see an increase of nearly 22 percent in the perceived level of influence of an administrator. Similarly, with respect to contacts initiated by the governor’s staff, we likewise see an increase in about 15 percent when we move from the minimum to the maximum value in the data. When both of these variables move together, we see even greater agency influence on gubernatorial decision-making with increases of as much as 36 percent.

Within the model predicting agency influence on the decision-making of the governor the variables dealing with networking practices present a mixed picture. The first variable, *Agency Policy Influence on Clientele Groups*, tapping the networking explanation is positive, which suggests that administrators who are more involved, connected, and influential within their network of clientele groups are also more influential on gubernatorial decision-making. However, the second variable tapping this construct, the networking scale, is insignificant.

Of the six variables included in the model measuring the agency and issue environment, two had statistically significant effects—the *Number of Employees* and *Method of Appointment*. These results imply that in agencies with a larger number of employees, greater agency influence on gubernatorial decision-making is perceived. Additionally, in agencies in which the administrator was appointed by the governor, the level of influence with the governor rises. In fact, the predicted value of the dependent variable increases by nearly 7 percent when comparing those agency heads not appointed by the governor with those who were, all else being equal.

Three of the variables tapping differences in administrator characteristics have a statistically significant effect on the level of perceived agency policy influence exerted by the state administrator on the governor. When the administrator is of the same party as the governor,
the administrator has greater influence. Thus, it appears that political alignment is an important predictor with respect to explaining administrator influence in the executive branch. Additionally, the policy orientation of an administrator also has a statistically significant effect. Consequently, administrators who spend more time on policy development have greater influence on the governor, as do those who embrace the “give and take” of the policy process.

The Legislators’ Model. In Table 4, we present the findings from our model with Agency Policy Influence on the Legislature as the dependent variable. The pattern of results here is noticeably different than those observed in the previous model with respect to the influence mechanisms. Here we see no support for our hypothesized “oversight pathway” but strong support for the importance of agency networks. Thus, while the indicators of oversight were quite important for an agency head’s influence with the governor, with respect to the legislature, only one appears to matter—whether or not administrators viewed legislators as sources of priority changes for the agency. And while this oversight variable is statistically significant, the predicted values indicate that it is of little substantive effect. The other oversight variables are insignificant. When taken together, these findings imply that the greater communication generated via political oversight does not appear to change the overall patterns of administrative influence on legislative decision-making.

However, the two indicators of agency networking strength are both statistically significant and positive, illustrating that the network “prowess” of administrators is more important—and is more consistently important—to their ability to influence the legislature than it is for the elective executive. In fact, when we manipulate the predicted values of each of these independent variables to move from their minimum to maximum observed values in the data, the resulting shift in the legislators’ dependent variable is 28 percent and 12 percent, respectively.
And when both of these variables move together from their minimum to maximum, we see more clearly the importance of agency networks to the broader policymaking process, with agency influence on legislative decision-making increasing by 39 percent.

The pattern of results for the remaining variables generally parallels what was observed in the model of agency influence on the governor, with the exception of variables tapping the issue environment. In this category of variables, there are no statistically significant results. However, in the group of indicators tapping administrator characteristics, again we see that the administrator’s policymaking interests positively shape the influence he or she is able to hold over the legislature. Additionally, we see that political party matters, such that when the administrator is of the same party of the legislature, agency heads are more likely to perceive higher levels of influence. In neither model do any of the state-level variables that predict the varying levels of influence administrators perceive with respect to the governor or the legislature. Considering the level of variance identified to be attributable to state characteristics, however, this is not surprising. Additionally, the demographic administrator characteristics that are often demonstrated to play a role in managerial successes do not matter here—such as, levels of education, age, gender, race, and tenure—and thus, they have little effect on an administrator’s perceptions regarding their influence over the governor or the legislature.

In sum, these results suggest that the channels of communication opened by the political oversight mechanism do appear to drive the influence that an administrator is able to have over gubernatorial decision-making. However, for legislative influence, the depth and breadth of an administrator’s network appears to play a more prominent and consistent role across our measures of agency networking.
Conclusion

On the one hand, the literature grounded in the “politics-administrative dichotomy”, and to a lesser degree, some components of the “political control” literature, suggest that bureaucrat influence within the broader policymaking process ought to be either largely non-existent or severely limited. Yet, on the other hand, a separate and largely descriptive or theoretical in nature literature has developed that emphasizes the ability of the bureaucracy to influence the policy-related decision-making of elected officials (Rourke 1984; Ripley and Franklin 1987; Wilson 1989; O’Leary 1994; Kingdon 1995; Kaufman 2001). Given this impasse and the general lack of data, we conclude that the existing literature provides little empirical evidence regarding the macro-level degree of agency influence, if any, on the policy decision-making of elected officials, and if the influence does occur, almost no information the mechanisms that allow it to manifest itself. It is to these gaps in our understanding of bureaucratic politics that we address this article.

We make two contributions. First, we put forward a new argument rooted in both political science and public administration scholarship that suggests how agency officials may influence the broader policymaking process. We theorize that the active oversight of the bureaucracy instigated by elected officials can provide a means for agency officials to advance their policy recommendations and broaden their policy influence. Stated differently, we suggest that oversight first reduces the communication barriers between “principal” and “agent” and in doing so, increases the influence of administrative agencies with legislators and elected executives. This line of thinking matters because while direct effects of political oversight on the
bureaucracy have occupied a tremendous amount of scholarly attention, the potential “by-products” of this oversight have received almost no scholarly scrutiny.

The article’s second contribution is empirically-oriented, and thus begins to answer the calls for further research by O’Leary (1994), Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1995), and Krause (1996). In particular, we provide a quantitative assessment of our argument, and we utilize two types of data. We rely first on survey information from near 600 state agency heads from all types of administrative posts and each of the 50 states, and we then supplement these data with on state-level institutional powers, environmental characteristics, and partisanship. We find that state agency heads do, in fact, hold considerable influence over state legislative and gubernatorial decision-making; yet, this influence is far from absolute and varies noticeably across agencies. In doing so, we provide, to our knowledge, the first multi-agency and/or multi-state empirical measure of agency influence. We also uncover strong evidence in support of our hypothesized “oversight mechanism” within gubernatorial decision-making. However, oversight matters much less to agency influence in state legislatures, where we find that agencies with larger policy networks are better able to affect state legislator decision-making. In the end, we conclude that agencies hold noteworthy influence within the broader policymaking process, and in the case of the elected executive, part of this influence appears attributable to lines of communication opened due to the political oversight of the bureaucracy.

Our theory and findings augment the vast literature in political science and public administration debating the most appropriate conceptualization of the bureaucracy’s position within the broader system of democratic governance (Goodsell 1983; Hill 1991; Cook 1998; Kaufman 2001; Warner 2001; Demir and Nyhan 2008; Meier and O’Toole 2008; Demir 2009). Yet, of course, more work remains to be done. Future research ought to develop over time
measures of agency policy influence across multi-agencies, as well as investigate how,
specifically, agency officials use their expertise and information to bring about policy change.
Additionally, more work should push beyond our perception-based measures agency influence
and build on this article to establish a fuller understanding of the construct. Finally, more
theoretical work ought be brought to bear to fully understand the normative implications of these
findings for the place of agency officials within the U.S.’s system of representative democracy.
Table 1a. Descriptive Statistics for Table 3 Model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agency Policy Influence on Governor</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor as greater source of control and oversight</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor as source of priority change</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of contacts with governor initiated by governor</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of contacts with Governor’s staff initiated by governor’s staff</td>
<td>26.84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Policy Influence on Clientele Groups</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking Ability Scale</td>
<td>18.95</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Salience</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Employees</td>
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<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Budget</td>
<td>459.02</td>
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<td>68,900</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personal Powers of Governor</td>
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<td>2.65</td>
<td>4.75</td>
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<td>Number of Interest Group Registrations, 1999</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>2272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of time spent on policy development</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor Party Match</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor appointment with or without legislative consent</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aversion to the “give and take” of policymaking</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in Agency</td>
<td>13.21</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>54.40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>83</td>
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Table 1b. Descriptive Statistics for Table 4 Model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agency Policy Influence on Legislature</td>
<td>3.23</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature as greater source of control and oversight</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators as source of priority change</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of contacts with legislators initiated by legislators</td>
<td>20.52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of contacts with legislative staff initiated by legislative staff</td>
<td>20.55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
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<td>Agency Policy Influence on Clientele Groups</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking Ability Scale</td>
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<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Salience</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Employees</td>
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<td>11,118</td>
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<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>27.05</td>
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<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Interest Group Registrations, 1999</td>
<td>691.44</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of time spent on policy development</td>
<td>25.93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature Party Match</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor appointment with or without legislative consent</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aversion to the “give and take” of policymaking</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in Agency</td>
<td>13.24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>54.36</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Null Models of Agency Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed Effects</th>
<th>Agency Policy Influence on Governor</th>
<th>Agency Policy Influence on Legislature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept ($\gamma_{00}$)</td>
<td>3.0028* (0.0679)</td>
<td>3.1880* (0.0545)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Random Effect                 |                                     |                                        |
|-------------------------------|                                     |                                        |
| State-Level Variance ($u_{0j}$) | 0.0484                              | 0.0288                                |

| Intraclass Correlation        | 0.02                                | 0.02                                  |
| Coefficient (Proportion of Variance Explained by State-Level Variance Component) |                                        |                                        |

Note: *p<0.05, Two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4. Influencing the Legislature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Agency Policy Influence on Legislature</th>
<th>Percent Change in Predicted Value of Dependent Variable When Moving from Minimum to Maximum of Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oversight Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation as greater source of control and oversight</td>
<td>-0.0057 (0.0980)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators as source of priority change</td>
<td><strong>0.2439</strong> (0.0933)</td>
<td><strong>4.07%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of contacts with legislators initiated by legislators</td>
<td>0.004 (0.0018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of contacts with legislative staff initiated by legislative staff</td>
<td>0.0011 (0.0017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Policy Influence on Clientele Groups</td>
<td><strong>0.3301</strong> (0.0311)</td>
<td><strong>27.51%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking Ability Scale</td>
<td><strong>0.0295</strong> (0.0120)</td>
<td><strong>11.81%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency &amp; Issue Environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Salience</td>
<td>-0.1285 (0.0956)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Employees</td>
<td>0.00001 (0.00002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Budget</td>
<td>-0.00001 (0.00005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>0.0061 (0.0044)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>-0.0433 (0.1131)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Interest Group Registrations, 1999</td>
<td>0.0001 (0.0001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of time spent on policy development</td>
<td><strong>0.0158</strong> (0.0033)</td>
<td><strong>21.07%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature Party Match</td>
<td><strong>0.1892</strong> (0.0930)</td>
<td><strong>3.16%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor appointment with or without legislative consent</td>
<td>0.0742 (0.0966)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aversion to the “give and take” of policymaking</td>
<td><strong>0.0935</strong> (0.0476)</td>
<td><strong>6.33%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.0551 (0.0468)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.0243 (0.1006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>-0.0653 (0.1559)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in Agency</td>
<td>-0.0033 (0.0044)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.0079 (0.0060)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.3841 (0.9617)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<0.05; *p<0.10 - Two-tailed test; standard errors in parentheses. Models estimated using STATA, xtmixed function.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Agency Policy Influence on Legislature</th>
<th>Percent Change in Predicted Value of Dependent Variable When Moving from Minimum to Maximum of Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oversight Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature as greater source of control and oversight</td>
<td>-0.0057 (0.0980)</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators as source of priority change</td>
<td>0.2439** (0.0933)</td>
<td>4.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of contacts with legislators initiated by legislators</td>
<td>0.0004 (0.0018)</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of contacts with legislative staff initiated by legislative staff</td>
<td>0.0011 (0.0017)</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Policy Influence on Clientele Groups</td>
<td>0.3301** (0.0311)</td>
<td>27.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking Ability Scale</td>
<td>0.0295** (0.0120)</td>
<td>11.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency &amp; Issue Environment</td>
<td></td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency Salience</td>
<td>-0.1285 (0.0956)</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Employees</td>
<td>0.00001 (0.00002)</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Budget</td>
<td>-0.00001 (0.00005)</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Professionalism</td>
<td>0.0061 (0.0044)</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term Limits</td>
<td>-0.0433 (0.1131)</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Interest Group Registrations, 1999</td>
<td>0.0001 (0.0001)</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of time spent on policy development</td>
<td>0.0158** (0.0033)</td>
<td>21.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature Party Match</td>
<td>0.1892** (0.0930)</td>
<td>3.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor appointment with or without legislative consent</td>
<td>0.0742 (0.0966)</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aversion to the “give and take” of policymaking</td>
<td>0.0935** (0.0476)</td>
<td>6.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.0551 (0.0468)</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.0243 (0.1006)</td>
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Works Cited


